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This paper studies soil depletion incentives in a dynamic economic model under two different sources of 
revenue uncertainty (production- and output price risk). The focus is on the long-term effects of risk 
averse preferences. The land manager is assumed to posses three classes of instruments to control 
natural topsoil fertility over time. Each instrument is also assumed to have implications for expected 
short-run production. The analysis shows that the forces at play are different across the three 
agricultural activities considered and varies for the two sources of risk analysed. In order to predict how 
risk aversion may influence soil conservation incentives detailed information is needed about input use 
and cultivation practices and the farmers’ perception of their risk implications. If higher output is 
associated with higher levels of soil degradation, risk averse preferences will strengthen the incentives 
for soil conservation under output price uncertainty, and the same outcome is likely under production 
uncertainty. If higher levels of outputs is associated with lower levels of soil degradation, risk averse 
preferences will induce a farmer to conserve less soil under output price uncertainty, while the likely 
outcome of production uncertainty is the opposite 
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1. Introduction 
An important feature of agricultural resource decisions are their risky nature. Uncertainty is considered 
more of a problem for agricultural production than for most other production activities due to climatic 
variability and natural hazards such as the occurrence of pest and plagues. In addition a land manager 
is exposed to uncertainties through market fluctuations and policy interventions which also have 
consequences for prices, revenues and land values. Climatic uncertainty is especially pervasive and 
serious for tropical farmers due to extreme rainfall variability, because other changes in climate tend to 
be severe in their impact on crop yields, and due to the lack of well developed markets.  
 
In this paper we will study the implications of risk aversion for the resource management of land, with 
particular reference to Third World smallholders and the problem of stochastic production revenues. 
The presence of uncertainty raises interesting questions about the behaviour of farmers. Knowledge 
about risk-induced behaviour should act as benchmark for judging whether or not there is a rationale 
for policy intervention, and is important for the design of policies intended to provide insurance 
markets, credit markets, and when implementing soil conservation programs. However, the attractive-
ness of various policies can not only be judged in relation to risk behaviour only, it is also important to 
address other factors which can cause the private paths of soil degradation processes to deviate from 
the socially optimal one. Examples on such factors mentioned in the literature are short planning 
horizons, discounting and off-farm externalities (see Griffin and Stoll, 1984; Rausser, 1983; and 
Griffin and Bromley,1982). Furthermore, the implications from revenue uncertainty and risk 
preferences on resource management are not only relevant for agriculture in less developed regions but 
also for capital-intensive agriculture in industrialised regions since crop insurance in general is not 
widespread in agriculture. 
  
In the ongoing debate on risk and resource management incentives, in particular on developing 
countries, risk, uncertainty, and poverty are often mentioned as factors behind resource degradation. 
However, the causal links and the underlying assumptions are seldom explicitly stated. One of several 
possible interpretations is that risk averse attitudes contribute to a poorly management of natural 
resources. The aim of this paper is to explore how risk behaviour can affect the incentives for soil 
conservation in agricultural production systems. Arguments have long persisted that farmers are of 
necessity risk averse and empirical studies by Friend and Blume (1975), Hansen and Singleton (1983) 
and Wolf and Pohlman (1983) have supported this hypothesis. Strong evidence is also found against 
the hypothesis of risk neutrality for poor farmers in less developed regions (see Lipton, 1968; Schluter 
and Mount, 1976; Dillon and Scandizzo, 1978; and Binswanger and Sillers, 1983). While risk aversion 
seems to describe well risk preferences for farmers, another issue is the structure of such preferences. 
Here, the evidence is not conclusive. In studies by Hamal and Anderson (1982) and Schluter and 
Mount (1976) the risk premium was found to increase in poverty (income). A study by Binswanger 
and Sillers (1983) concluded that farmers are risk averse, but found that risk aversion stayed constant 
as income increases. 
 
There are studies in the soil conservation literature which discuss and/or present evidence on the 
importance of risk and risk preferences. Kramer, McSweeney and Stavros (1983) apply a Mean-
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Variance approach to analyse how risk affect farm level soil conservation decisions when uncertainty 
both in revenues and input costs are considered. However, as pointed out by Shortle and Stefanou 
(1986) they fail consider the dynamic nature of soil conservation issues. Shortle and Stefanou suggest 
a dynamic extension of the model to be applied in numerical examinations of interlinkages between 
risk, risk aversion and conservation incentives. Other studies in the literature apply Stochastic 
Dominance analysis, a useful method for evaluating risky choices, on related issues. Klemme (1985) 
applies this approach on experimental plot yield data from Indiana to compare different tillage systems 
and found that risk averse farmers are more likely to adopt conservation tillage systems than risk 
neutral farmers. The same method is applied by Williams (1985) for the Central Great plains 
presenting related findings. A different approach is applied in Ervin and Ervin (1982) who present 
results from a multiple regression analysis. They found that soil conservation practices decrease as the 
level of risk aversion rises. An opposing result is presented in Reinhardt (1987) in a study of 
Colombian farmers. Here, farmers were categorised as risk averse which made them reluctant to adopt 
new cultivation practices that ignored soil conservation. McSweeney and Kramer (1986) find that an 
unintended side effect of governmental support programs have been that farmers have brought 
additional, often fragile lands, into production. A conclusion which seems to support the notion of risk 
aversion acting as an incentive to conserve soil. Anderson and Thampapillai (1995) surveys issues and 
evidence on soil conservation incentives when discussing the importance of risk and risk aversion and 
find that the evidence is mixed and that the role of risk should be subjected to further analysis. 
Williams and Johnson (1985) find that there is a fine line between whether risk aversion is positive or 
negative factor in adopting conservation measures. 
 
Most of the studies mentioned above do not relate their findings explicitly to results arrived at in the 
theory. One reason for this may be that theoretical studies on soil conservation incentives and risk in 
general are lacking. One exception is a paper by Ardila and Innes (1993) where soil depletion choices 
of a risk averse farmer have been explored in a purely theoretical framework. Their analysis is 
conducted within two related models, where land degradation is output-induced in that higher outputs 
is associated with higher levels of soil degradation, and the farmer has DARA (decreasing absolute 
risk aversion) preferences. First, they present a two-date model with uncertainty both in revenues and 
in end-of-land price, where the land manager is to decide upon output and consumption. Second, they 
present a three-date model in which production and consumption choices are made in both periods, but 
there is uncertainty only in the second period. Here, the attention is primarily focused on the case of 
revenue risk. Ardila and Innes relate their results to standard results from the literature on production 
under uncertainty, in which output is risky and where an increased level of risk aversion makes the 
farmer to produce less. Ardila and Innes identify two conditions for which risk-averse farmers will 
produce more (exploit the soil more intensively) than risk neutral counterparts; i) when land risk 
«dominates» production revenue risk (in the two period model) ii) In the three-period model, 
considering production revenue risk only, risk aversion will under certain conditions induce the farmer 
to exploit soil more intensively (higher output) on a short-term (in period 2), while the long-term 
effect of risk aversion still yields less exploitation of the soil (less output). As a consequence, standard 
conclusions from literature on production under risk are reversed. However, if the two conditions are 
not fulfilled, a declining wealth (higher risk aversion) will induce the farmer to produce less thus soil 
conservation incentives are improved. 
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The purpose of this paper is much the same as in Ardila and Innes (1993). I want to investigate 
relationships between farming decisions and risk behaviour by using a theoretical model in order to 
derive qualitative properties of optimal choices of soil conservation in an uncertain environment. The 
findings can help us to understand the forces at play and provide us with a framework which enables 
us to predict the outcome of risk behaviour in agricultural production systems. A dynamic model of 
soil degradation will be applied for this purpose, but the aim of this analysis is more restricted than is 
the case for study by Ardila and Innes, since only revenue uncertainty is considered. Unlike Ardila and 
Innes (1993) we pay explicit attention to the random features of weather in a multi-period framework 
and two different types of revenue uncertainty is considered at a time; output uncertainty and crop 
price uncertainty. Furthermore, we will relax the assumption of output-induced soil degradation. This 
is done by focusing on input decisions rather than output itself as the decision variable. Such a 
disaggregated approach makes it natural also to discuss risk implications of various production factors. 
I assume that peasants have well-defined property rights on a given area of land with an infinite 
horizon, facing only one source of uncertainty, revenue risk. I rule out the case where the evolution of 
the soil stock is stochastic.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. In the next section a deterministic dynamic model of land 
degradation is presented together with a justification of the functional relationships assumed. In 
section 3, the analysis is conducted in order to ascertain whether risk averse farmers faced with 
production uncertainty have incentives to deplete their resource base. In section 4 the same analysis is 
conducted but now the focus is on output price uncertainty. Last section summarises the findings. 
2. An economic model of soil degradation 
In this chapter an economic model of soil degradation is presented. The model is intended to capture 
some important features associated with agricultural production systems and how they interact with 
the soil base. A model of this kind must be a simplification of the complex interlinkages between 
farming choices and soil dynamics. In addition there is tremendous variation across the world as 
concerning cultivation practices, input use, and the importance of physical factors such as climate, 
topography, and soils, all factors which makes it difficult to model human-soil interactions in 
simplistic models. However, most decisions made by a land manager have consequences both for 
short-term output and the long-term fertility of the soil resource, even though the effects may vary in 
importance across regions. The model presented below considers the production of a single crop (or a 
given crop mix) and consists of three functions; a crop production function, an input costs function, 
and a function describing how soil evolves over time. In the following each of the functions and their 
properties will be presented. In addition the model will be compared with other economic models on 
soil management together with a more detailed justification of the relationships assumed. 
 
There are three variable inputs or types of agricultural activities in the model. Each input (or activity) 
is classified according to its’ effect both on short-term output and the future fertility of soil. Z(t) is 
denoted productive inputs or cultivation intensity, which when applied in larger quantities are assumed 
to increase output and degrade the soil. W(t) is denoted win-win inputs, which increases output and 
saves the soil when applied in larger quantities. C(t) is denoted soil conservation measures or 
conservation intensity and is assumed to decrease output and save soil. In addition soil fertility, S(t), is 
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a capital stock and can be said to represent the stock of top soil fertility (soil base). The agricultural 
production function is a function of soil fertility and the three variable inputs, ψ(St,Zt,Ct,Wt) and 
assumed to be strictly concave in S, Z, C, and W. The input cost function, h(Zt,Ct,Wt), is assumed to 
be increasing in each of the three variable inputs. Soil is considered a renewable resource and it’s 
evolution depends on all three variable inputs. The soil dynamics equation is represented by the 
following equation;  
 
(1) & ,S M -  n(Z ,C W )
t t t
=  
 
where M is a constant representing the natural rate of soil fertility regeneration, and n(Z,C,W) the fertility 
loss function
1
. Even though the effects of soil regeneration processes like soil formation and nutrient 
recycling may be minor in any one year they become important over time. All functions are assumed 
continuos and twice differentiable. 
 
The technological properties assumed so far can be summarised as follows; 
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Like other economic models on soil degradation and/or soil erosion appearing in the literature this 
model lets soil fertility be represented by one stock variable only, intended to represent various 
characteristics of the soil like organic matter, mineral content, soil depth and water holding capacity. 
Furthermore, to limit the number of control variables, cultivation practices and/or inputs with similar 
features are collapsed into one decision variable, and can be said to represent a vector or an index. 
Apart from win-win inputs, the structure of this model share similarities with other deterministic 
dynamic models on land degradation and soil erosion. In a study by LaFrance (1992), the land 
manager has two means at his disposal to influence the soil base; an index of crop increasing/land 
degrading inputs and an index of soil conserving/crop reducing inputs. Barbier (1990) applies a soil 
erosion model first presented by McConnel (1983) with a cultivation input package and a conservation 
input package. Barrett (1996) also present a model on the optimal control of soil erosion, in which 
there is; a trade-off variable between immediate output and soil depth (cultivation intensity), a variable 
representing soil conservation measures, but also an index of non-soil inputs which are assumed to 
increase output but have no effect on future soil depth. Another feature which distinguishes the model 
of LaFrance (1992) from the ones of Barbier (1990) and Barrett (1996) is that LaFrance assumes 
conservation inputs to reduce immediate output. 
The empirical justification of the functional relationships differs to some extent across the models. 
This matters in particular for the decision variable representing a trade-off between immediate output 
and future soil productivity (Z). In the literature there are several studies which refer to output-induced 
soil degradation processes. Inputs that increase crop production can contribute to land degradation and 
                                                     
1 There is considerable uncertainty associated with rates of soil regeneration (Johnson et al., 1987).  Here we 
choose to follow Barrett (1996), Ardila and Innes (1993) and McConnel (1983) by assuming an autonomus 
growth in the soil stock. 
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many cultivation practices tend to degrade soil over time (see e.g. Burch, Graetz and Nobel, 1987; 
Lutz, Pagiola and Reicher, 1994). LaFrance (1992) argues in favour of fertiliser, irrigation and 
ploughing to increase output and degrade land when employed in larger quantities (see LaFrance, 
1992 and the numerous references therein). Ardila and Innes (1993) apply similar arguments when 
justifying that higher production is associated with more degradation, and also mentions fallowing as 
an example of output-induced soil-depletion. Barbier (1990) refers to productive inputs (and labour), 
crop varieties, and cropping patterns and techniques as examples, while Barrett (1996) direct attention 
to cultivation practices such as strip-cropping and the extent and nature of crop rotation.  
 
The trade-off between output and land degradation also describes important sides of agricultural 
production in farming systems with a low intensity of external inputs. Examples here are seedbed 
preparation and tillage practices, weeding, timing decisions and cropland expansion. A farmer may 
increase output by conducting more intensive tillage practices (deep ploughing) instead of no or 
minimum tillage practices, by smoothening the seedbeds with secondary tillage, by using plough and 
animal traction instead of tillage by hand and planting in small pockets. All decisions which may 
increase short-term output but also cause more erosion thus imposing future productivity losses
2
. Lal 
(1987) finds erosion losses from ploughed croplands to be 5 to 400 times higher than for no-tilled and 
Lal (1986) reports that erosion is more severe on ploughed and harrowed land than on reduced- and no 
tilled. Furthermore, Lutz, Pagiola and Reiche (1994) find that repeated tillage can weaken the soil 
structure. Timing decisions as delayed planting and waiting to perform tillage operations will shorten 
the growing season, but protect soils if implemented in periods where the most erosive storms are 
concentrated (Barber, 1984; Wiscmeier and Smith, 1978). Finally, a farmer can put more land into 
cultivation by cultivating marginal lands and clearing hillsides (McConnel, 1983).  
 
A farmer can also maintain natural soil fertility or arrest the rate at which land are degrading, by 
investing in structural soil conservation measures such as terraces, ditches, windbreaks, bundles, hedge 
rows and stonewalls. All such measures are in this model represented by the intensity of conservation, 
C, where a higher value means that more resources are devoted to this activity. We follow LaFrance 
(1992) by assuming that a higher C reduces current production, since structures themselves take up 
productive land. Lal (1982) and Lutz, Pagiola and Reiche (1994) find that structures reduce the 
effective area by 10-15 %. 
 
The third group of activities considered in this analysis is inputs and/or farming practices which when 
implemented increase both immediate output and dampen land degradation processes. Such win-win 
strategies (W), or overlapping technologies in the terminology of Reardon and Vosti (1992), seem to 
be ignored in many economic studies on land degradation and soil conservation. Recently, however, 
we have witnessed an increasing awareness of such technologies in the economic literature. Several 
studies on Africa stress the importance of external inputs in both arresting soil erosion and increasing 
short run output (see Brekke et al., 1996; Aune et al., 1994; and Aune and Lal, 1995, Alfsen et al., 
1995). The application of fertilisers, irrigation and agrochemicals will provide land with a denser 
vegetation and improve the root structure of plants, both factors which provide a better protection of 
                                                     
2 Several studies find that there is a yield penalty associated with minimum tillage methods (see e.g. Walker and 
Young, 1986). 
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soils, thus reducing both water run-off and erosion (Roose, 1977). In addition higher yields also imply 
additional crop residues which supplies the soil with nitrogen if left on land in-between harvesting and 
sowing. Logan and Lal (1990), in a study on the Dominican Republic, found that erosion and runoff 
were lower on fertilised plots compared to unfertilised ones. Other examples could be crop residue 
management including mulching, liming, and cropping combined with legumes. Reardon and Vosti 
(1992) mention tied ridges as yet another important example. 
 
The relevance of the assumption of the cost function being monotone in each of the three activities is 
obvious with respect to marketed inputs, but also seem to capture essential features with other farming 
decisions as well. Soil conservation structures are costly to construct both in terms of input and labour 
use (see e.g. Lal, 1987; and Lutz, Pagiola and Reiche, 1994). More intensive cultivation will in general 
imply that additional resources need to be devoted to cultivation activities. Increasing the area of land 
under cultivation and extending the crop season will bring about the need for additional inputs and 
more labour effort. Practising more intensive tillage operations and secondary tillage imply additional 
labour requirements. Reicosky et al. (1977) for example, find that minimum tillage reduces labour 
requirements. The application of crop residues involves opportunity costs since stalks and straws have 
an alternative value as fuel and/or fodder. 
3. Production uncertainty and the incentives for soil conservation 
This section investigates how risk behaviour affects soil depletion choices under production 
uncertainty and tries to identify factors which are of importance for determining such behaviour. This 
is done by introducing production uncertainty due to climatic variations and/or the occurrence of 
natural hazards into the model. To investigate the role of risk in agriculture, it is important to apply a 
specification of the production function with reasonable risk implications. In agriculture, it is not 
necessarily a unique relationship between the variance of output and the quantity applied of all inputs. 
Just and Pope (1978) find it likely that additional land use and chemical thinning processes will 
increase the variance of production attributable to weather, insects and crop diseases, while the effects 
of pesticides, irrigation, frost protection, and decease-resistant seeds may have opposite effects. Here I 
will apply a specification suggested by Just and Pope (1978) to take account of such relationships. Let 
the stochastic production function be as follows; 
 
(3a) Ψ( , , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , )S Z C W f S Z W C g S Z C W
t t t t t t t t t t t t t t
θ θ= +   
 
It follows from (3a) that the production function consists of two components. First, a deterministic 
component, f, for which the technology assumptions are similar to the ones assumed for ψ in (2). 
Second, an additive stochastic component, g, which depends on the same arguments as f, but for which 
the first derivatives are allowed to be signed differently. θt represents the stochastic disturbance and 
enters the stochastic component mulitplicatively. The first derivative of g with respect to each of the 
production factors determines what the risk property of each production factor is. In the following we 
will denote inputs risk-increasing if the first derivative of g with respect to the same activity is 
positive, risk-neutral if the first derivative is zero, and risk-decreasing if the first derivative is negative. 
The assumptions made on the overall production function ψ in (2) still remain valid.  
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The land manager is assumed to be risk averse, and the farmers' Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
function, U, is assumed to be twice differentiable, increasing and concave in current net returns, Πt , 
where (the output price is set equal to one);  
 
(3b) 
t t t t t t t t t
 =  (S Z C W  -  h(Z C W )∏ Ψ , , , , ) , ,θ  
 
The objective of a rational farmer under production uncertainty is to maximise the discounted 
expected utility of net returns of crop production where the constraint on this decision problem is (1). 
The timing and actions over time are as follows. The farmer makes decisions about input use and level 
of activities before the outcome of the stochastic event is known. As a consequence the farmer does 
not know the value of θt when decisions are made. The sequential nature of the decision process 
suggests a discrete-time modelling approach. However, I have chosen to solve this problem in 
continuos-time by using deterministic controls since such an approach is a more powerful device for 
solving dynamic optimisation problems as compared to discrete-time techniques, especially in a multi-
period formulation. This can be done since the outcome of a stochastic event in our problem does not 
influence actions and since the soil stock at any time can be predicted exactly from current stock level 
and input use. Furthermore, it is assumed that θt = dBt , where Bt is a Brownian motion, thus θt is 
normally distributed. 
 
The maximisation problem for our problem given an infinite horizon is  
(4)
Max E{U[f(S , Z ,C W g S Z C W - h(Z ,C W )]}e dt
s. t.   S =  M -  n(Z ,C W ),   S(0) = S ,  Z(t) > 0, C(t) > 0 and W t .
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where E is the expectation operator with respect to θ and r the utility discount factor. Let Q denote the 
current value Hamiltonian for this optimal control problem (time references are in the following 
omitted) 
 
(5) Q =  E{U[f(S, Z,C W) g S Z C W -  h(Z,C W)]}+  [M - n Z C W ], ( , , , ) , ( , , )+ θ λ  
 
where λ is the current value shadow price for the soil state equation. Since the Hamiltonian is strictly 
concave in Z, C, and W, respectively, λ0=1 and assuming interior solutions, the sufficient conditions 
for an optimal solution are (Seierstad and Sydsæter, 1987); 
 
(6a) 
Z Z Z Z Z
Q = E{U [ ] f (S, Z,C W) g S Z C W - h (Z,C W) }- n (Z,C W) = 0Π Π [ , ( , , , ) , ] ,+ θ λ  
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(6d) sQ = E{U [ ] f (S, Z,C W) g S Z C W } = r -    S(t) 0S S
t
Π
Π [ , ( , , , ) ] & lim+ ≥
→∞
θ λ λ  
(6e) & , ) lim ( )S =  M -  n(Z,C W  -rte t = 0
t→∞
λ  
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Eqs.(6a-c) say that along the optimal path the expected marginal utility-increase (decrease) associated 
with higher input use minus the marginal change in input costs generated from the same increase must 
equal the change in the fertility loss function that goes with the same change in input evaluated by the 
shadow price of soil (λ). Eq.(6d) determines the adjustment in λ along the optimal path. The following 
expression for the shadow price of soil in optimum can be derived; 
 
(7) { }λ θ τ ττ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ τ(t) = rte
t
U ( ) f (S , Z C W g S Z C W -re dS sΕ ΠΠ
∞
∫ +[ , , ) ( , , , ) ]( ) ( )  
 
The shadow price of soil is in optimum equal to the expected utility-decrease caused by a marginal 
reduction in soil fertility at time t for all future periods. It is further noted that the shadow price of soil 
not only reflects the expected value of future output losses (gains) due to a reduction (increase) in the 
stock of soil fertility associated with level changes in each of the three activities, but also incorporates 
risk preferences of the land manager through the curvature of the utility function in current income. 
This finding is important and emphasises the importance of a multi-period formulation of optimal soil 
conservation decisions.  
 
A convenient way to study risk-averse farmers' long term reactions to the presence of output 
uncertainty is to analyse the model in steady state. Steady state equilibrium is attained when 
dλ/dt=dS/dt=0. Letting bars denote steady-state equilibrium values, imposing the stationary conditions 
on (6a-d), and (1), and combining the same equations, the optimality conditions can be presented as 
follows 
 
(8a) f S Z C W   h Z C W  =  
n Z C W
r
f S Z C W i Z C W
i i i
i
S( , , , ) ( , , )
( , , )
( , , , ) , ,+ − =α γ  
(8b) M n Z C W= ( , , )  
 
where  
(9a) 
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(9b) and g S Z C W
r
n Z C W g S Z C W i Z C W
i i i s
α ≡ − =( , , , ) ( , , ) ( , , , ) , ,
1
  
From (8a-b) and (9a-b) it is observed that the structure of risk preferences in our model is now isolated 
to the second term on the left hand side of each of the three optimality conditions described in (8a), 
represented by γ. γ can be said to represent the security equivalent for θ and reflects to what degree θ 
contributes to uncertainty in profits. It is further noticed that there is one more factor appearing in the 
second term of (8a). In each optimality condition which corresponds to a certain input there is a αi 
associated with the same input. Such factors will in the following will be denoted risk-factors and can 
be said to represent an overall risk effect. From (9b) it is seen that the risk-factor for a variable input i 
depends on the risk properties of the variable input itself (gi) and the stock the variable (gs). In 
addition the risk factor for an input i, depends on the first derivative of the fertility loss function (ni) 
and the utility discount rate. The first derivatives of the stochastic component of the production 
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function with respect to a production factor i determines how the variability in output at an instant of 
time is affected by changes in the same factor at the same instant. This term can be said to represent an 
immediate-risk effect. The second term present in the risk-factor represents a long-term risk effect. 
Remember that changing the quantity applied of a variable input have implications for the stock of soil 
fertility being available in the future. The direction of such changes are determined by the first 
derivative of the soil loss function, while the first derivative of the stochastic component of the 
production function with respect to soil stock reflects what the implications are for future variability in 
output for the same change. The utility discount factor appearing in the denominator of the long-term 
risk effect simply ensures that changes in the risk implications for the rest of the horizon are evaluated 
at current values. We have shown that the magnitude and sign of the second term of each optimality 
condition presented in (8a) depends on the structure of risk preferences (security equivalent) and 
possible immediate - and long-term risk effects (risk factor).  
 
The assumption of risk aversion, UΠΠ<0, implies that Cov[UΠ,θ]<0
3
 and consequently γ < 0. Hence, 
the optimality conditions becomes different from the same conditions in the situation in which 
attitudes to risk are absent, UΠΠ=0 ⇒ γ=0. A first and rather trivial conclusion is that climatic 
uncertainty does influence a risk averse farmer's incentives for soil conservation, thus causing fertility 
losses to deviate from the risk neutral path. If the social value attached to the soil stock is different 
from that of the farmer, the private optimal path is different from the social optimal one. This will be 
the case if governments are risk neutral which implies that there is a rational for policy intervention in 
the resource management of cultivated land. This conclusion, however, does not always remain true. 
Remember that all effects which are generated from the modelling of output uncertainty in this model 
occur in one term only (see 8a). If each of the three risk-factors equals zero then the structure of risk 
preferences does not influence optimal behaviour. This will matter if all production factors in our 
model are defined as risk-neutral, gi=0 for i = S,Z,C,W (e.g. additive risk). Given these assumptions 
the optimal path for risk averse farmer will coincide with the path of a risk neutral farmer, and our 
problem can be said to degenerate to a deterministic one. A rational farmer will now at the margin 
balance changes in immediate output (revenue) arising from additional input use with the changes in 
variable input costs and the shadow value of soil that goes with the same change. If however, at least 
one of the production factors is risk increasing or -decreasing, risk preferences will play a role for 
optimal behaviour. How, risk aversion affects the optimal soil conservation incentives still remains a 
question and such issues will be pursued below. 
 
A general problem when analysing the role of risk preferences in dynamic stochastic models is that 
changing the structure of risk preferences have consequences for the utility function in the sense that 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution changes. However, the shape of the utility function does not 
affect the steady in this model. To see this, disregard for a moment uncertainty in the model, then by 
combining (6a-e), the optimality conditions in steady state can be described as follows; 
 
(10a) U f g h
n
r
U f g i Z C W
i i i
i
S SΠ Π
Π Π( )[ ] ( )[ ] , , .+ − = + =  
 
                                                     
3 There exists probability distributions for which this result not necessarily is valid (see Lund, 1993). 
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From (10a) it is noticed that the curvature of the utility of net income has no impact on endogenous 
variables.  
 
 As mentioned above, the implications of an uncertain environment are in our model isolated to one 
term in (8a), represented by the product of the security equivalent and the risk-factor for each variable 
input. Furthermore, I have argued for that the presence of risk averting attitudes compared to risk 
neutral ones can be interpreted as a shift in γ. In order to derive what the effects on soil conservation 
incentives are from risk averse preferences one approach could be to undertake comparative statics in 
steady state with respect to γ. However, a higher value γ is not only reflecting changes in the structure 
of risk preferences but also measures the degree of uncertainty. To see this we can apply a theorem by 
Rubinstein (1976). Since Π is normally distributed γ can be written as follows 
 
(10b) γ θ≡ = =R COV R g S Z C W where R
E U
E U
( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , , , ) ( )
{ ( )}
{ ( )}
Π Π Π Π
Π
Π
ΠΠ
Π
 
 
From (10b) we notice that γ is the product of R and a covariance. R can be said to measure the degree 
of risk aversion and Varian (1992) denotes R - global risk aversion. A higher R means that an 
individual becomes more risk averse for all levels (global) of net returns, while the covariance term 
measures the degree of uncertainty. Conducting a shift in R instead of γ would be a better approach to 
analyse the role of risk preferences in this model. Here, however, I will choose a slightly different 
approach which simplifies the analysis in several respects. Since Π is normally distributed choices 
among net returns can be reduced to a comparison on their means and variances and expected utility 
(mean-variance utility function). Let expected utility be as follows  
 
(11) E U E VAR{ ( )} ( ) ( )Π Π Π= − β  
 
From (11) it follows that expected utility can be expressed as a linear function in the mean and the 
variance of net returns. β has a clear interpretation as the degree of risk aversion. Now, replace the 
utility function in problem (4) with the one in (11). Above, Var(Π) was set equal to g(S,Z,C,W.)2, now 
we assume that var(Π) is g(S,Z,C,W). As will be seen from below, steady state for this problem 
coincides with the one in (8) if β=-γ. The Hamiltonian for this problem, still denoted H, is  
 
(12a) H f S Z C W h Z C W g S Z C W M n Z C W= − − + −( , , , ) ( , , ) ( , , , ) [ ( , , )]β λ  
 
The assumptions made for problem (4) still remain valid, thus the optimality conditions for this 
problem are; 
 
(12b) H
i
f
i
S Z C W h
i
Z C W g
i
S Z C W n
i
Z C W i Z C W= − − = =( , , , ) ( , , ) - ( , , , ) ( , , )β λ 0 , , .  
(12c) H
s
f
s
S Z C W S Z C W r= − = −( , , , ) g
s
β λ λ( , , , )
.
 
(1) S M n Z C W
.
( , , )= −  
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An investigation of the effect of a higher degree of risk aversion on soil conservation incentives can 
now be undertaken by conducting changes in β. Imposing the stationary conditions on the optimality 
conditions in (12bc) and (1) and differentiating the system w.r.t S, Z, C, W and β, yields after some 
tedious algebra, the following expression for the impact on steady state soil fertility (all arguments are 
evaluated in steady state);  
 
(13)
dS
d D
n R R R R R R R R R R
n R R R R R R R R R R
n R R R R R R R R R R
Z Z CC WW CW WC ZC C WW W CW ZW W CC C WC
W Z CZ WZ CC WZ ZZ C WC W CC ZC C WZ W CZ
C Z CZ WW CW WZ ZZ C WW W CW ZW C WZ W CZ
β
α α α α α
α α α α α
α α α α α
= − − − + −
+ − − − + −
− − − − + −
1
{ [ ( ) ( ) ( )]
[ ( ) ( ) ( )]}
[ ( ) ( ) ( )]}
 
 
 
where αZ, αC, and αW are risk-factors for this problem and defined in (9b) while all R-terms are 
defined in Appendix 1. D<0 follows from the saddle path condition for this problem (see Appendix 1). 
 
When studying (13) in more detail it follows that the total impact of a higher degree of risk aversion 
(or risk averse preferences compared to risk neutral ones) on steady state soil fertility can be said to 
depend on three categories of effects. First, the partial derivatives of the fertility loss function, ni, for 
each of the three variable inputs, which are already signed from (1). Second, from the risk-factor for 
each input, αi , whose signs depend on assumptions made on the risk properties of all production 
factors. Third, the R-terms which all are functions of second order derivatives of the Hamiltonian 
function, and depend on cross partial derivatives of the production function, the cost function and the 
fertility loss function with respect to different pair wise combinations of the production factors 
(hereafter denoted indirect effects). The complexity of the numerator of (13) makes it difficult to 
comment on the various forces at play. Instead, I choose to focus on partial models rather than the 
general one, an approach which provides us with a better understanding of the forces at play.  
Let X be a single input variable which can represent Z, C, or W, while S is still the stock of soil 
fertility. The maximisation problem for a mean-variance utility function now becomes   
(14) 
Max F(S , X - T(X G S X }e dt
s. t.   S =  M -  N(X ,   S(0) = S ,  X(t) > 0.
Z C W
0
0
t t t t t
-rt
t 0
, ,
{ ) ) ( , )
& )
λ β
∞
∫ −
> 0
 
Which input X is meant to represent depends on the assumptions made on technology. The following 
three partial models is considered where capital letters now describe functional forms; 
 
 Cultivation model: FX>0, NX>0. (C and W are ignored)  
(15) Win-win model: FX>0, NX<0. (Z and C are ignored) 
 Conservation model: FX<0, NX<0. (Z and W are ignored) 
 
The assumptions on variable costs are the same for all partial models (TX>0), while G(S,X) will be 
discussed below. The Hamiltonian for this problem (still denoted H) is assumed to be strictly concave 
in S and X. Following the same procedures as above, the following expression for the impact on 
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steady state soil fertility from a higher degree of risk aversion is derived (tilde now denote steady state 
values) 
 
(16) 
dS
d D
G
N
r
G
H
N
r
H
X
X
X
X
XS
X
SS
~ ( )
[ ]
β
α
= =
−
−
 
 
The saddle path condition for this problem imply that the denominator in (16), D, is positive for NX>0 
(Cultivation model) and negative for NX <0 (Win-win model and Conservation model). To be able to 
sign (16) we need to sign the numerator (αX  where X= Z, C,W) which is the risk-factor for each of the 
three partial models. 
 
In the following I will discuss the signs of the risk- factors in more detail. As mentioned above their 
sign will depend on the assumptions made about the risk properties of each production factor in the 
three partial models. Below we present a table where all possibilities are summarised. Some of our 
earlier conclusions are easily confirmed in Table 1. First, if all production factors are risk neutral all 
risk-factors become equal to zero. Second, if some production factors are risk-increasing or risk 
decreasing the risk factors are in general different from zero. It is further noticed that there are some 
sets of assumptions which make it impossible to sign the risk- factor for a variable input. For 
productive inputs (Z), this matter if productive inputs and soil are assumed to have opposite risk 
properties. For soil conservation measures(C) and win-win inputs (W) this matter if they have similar 
risk properties. For all other sets of assumptions, the risk-factors can be signed. 
 
 
Sufficient conditions for the risk-factor of Z being negative (αX <0) are that productive inputs are risk-
decreasing (GX<0), while the stock of soil fertility is risk-increasing or risk neutral (GS≥ 0). Given that 
productive inputs are risk-decreasing the immediate-risk effect for productive inputs is negative. 
Additional productive inputs will cause the stock of soil fertility to be lower in all future periods since 
productive inputs are defined as land-degrading (NX>0). Given that soil quality is categorised as risk-
increasing, GS>0, the long-term risk effect also becomes negative. The two effects pull in the same 
direction and the risk-factor can be signed. If soil quality is considered risk-neutral, GS = 0, the sign of 
the risk-factor will be determined by the immediate-risk effect only and vice versa. The above 
Table 1.  Signing risk factors under different assumptions about the risk properties of produc-
tion factors. 
 Productive inputs (Z) 
 
Win-win activities (W) and Soil 
conservation measures (C) i=W,C 
Soil (S) Risk  
increasing 
Risk  
neutral 
Risk  
decreasing 
Risk  
increasing 
Risk  
neutral 
Risk  
decreasing 
Risk increasing αz=? αz<0 αz<0 αi>0 αi>0 αi=? 
Risk neutral αz>0 αz=0 αz<0 αi>0 αi=0 αi<0 
Risk decreasing αz>0 αz>0 αz=? αi=? αi<0 αi<0 
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discussion illustrates that those table elements in Table 1 which can not be signed arises from 
opposing immediate - and long-term risk effects.  
 
So far it is shown that signs of the risk-factors can in principle go either way. As a consequence it is 
not possible to sign (16) independent of which variable input (partial model) is considered. A natural 
next step is to apply evidence which can help rule out some of the table-elements in Table 1. To my 
knowledge there is no systematic research done on the risk properties of various inputs and farming 
practices or the soil stock itself. However, in the literature there are some statements which can aid us 
in signing the risk-factors. Colacicco, Osborn and Alt (1989) claim that soil erosion (lower soil depth) 
may increase the variability of production regardless of its effect on average yields. Reinhardt (1987), 
in a Colombian study, found that farmers resisted modernisation programs which ignored soil 
conservation, since increased losses due to soil erosion and fertility losses would increase crop risk. 
Reicovsky et. al (1977) claim that conservation practices to some extent modify future risks of crop 
failure by conserving moisture. One the basis of the above references it seems that soil depth or soil 
fertility best can be described as a risk-decreasing production factor in agriculture. A higher stock of 
soil fertility is often associated with deeper soils, better chemical and structural properties of the soil 
which again improves the soils’ moisture holding capacity and imply higher infiltration rates. All 
properties which are most likely to reduce the variability in output in seasons with both rainwater 
deficiency and excessive precipitation. Applying this information about the properties of soil limits the 
number of possible outcomes in Table 1. The risk-factor for a productive input is positive if the input 
is not risk-decreasing. The risk-factor for a conservation input and a win-win input are negative as 
long as these inputs are not risk-increasing.  
 
The evidence that exists on the risk properties of variable inputs seems to support a classification of 
productive inputs as being risk-increasing, and win-win inputs and soil conservation measures as being 
risk-decreasing. Bishop and Allen (1989) find that there are often important secondary benefits 
associated with structural soil conservation measures, due to improved moisture retention and 
increased infiltration rates besides the actual reduction in soil and fertility losses experienced over 
time. The risk properties of productive inputs and win-win inputs are more complex to predict, partly 
because their classification depends on which degradation processes are considered. If the focus is on 
soil erosion, many external inputs can be viewed as win-win inputs due to their land cover effects. Just 
and Pope (1978) classifies both irrigation, pesticides, and herbicides as risk-decreasing inputs, while 
they refer to cropland expansion (more intensive cultivation), as a risk-increasing strategy. On the 
basis of the above discussion it seems reasonable to sign the risk-factor of productive inputs 
positively, while win-win and soil conservation inputs have negative risk- factors. 
 
By applying the conclusions arrived at with respect to the signs of three risk- factors, it follows that 
(16) becomes positive for all three models. As a consequence the incentives for soil conservation are 
strengthened in each model for a higher degree of risk aversion. This finding needs to be accompanied 
with some intuition. Let us first consider productive inputs (cultivation model). Given that productive 
inputs are risk-increasing it becomes optimal, ceterius paribus, for a risk averse farmer at the margin to 
apply less of this input due to the increase in output variability that arises from such input use. A risk 
averse decision maker will give weight to the risk properties of productive inputs and not only 
consider changes in expected profits as will be the situation for a risk neutral decision maker. In 
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addition risk preferences encompass future events, in the sense that risk implications which evolves 
over time from changes in productive input use (long-term risk effect) are paid attention to. Remember 
that less use of degrading productive inputs will increase the stock of soil for all future periods and 
thus represent not only future expected production gains but also involve risk implications perceived 
as costly or beneficial depending on how soil stock changes affect future output variability. Since soil 
is a classified as a risk-decreasing production factor, less use of productive inputs will at the margin 
reduce output variability in all future crop seasons, events which will considered as beneficial for a 
risk averse farmer. I have shown that the immediate risk effect and the long-term risk effect pulls in 
the same direction, as a consequence a risk averse farmer compared to a risk neutral one will devote 
less resources to land degrading activities, thus the incentives for soil depletion which is spurred from 
productive inputs have weakened. The same conclusion apply if productive inputs are risk neutral, 
since in this case the sign of the long-term risk effect is decisive for the signing of the risk-factor.  
 
If risk-decreasing conservation measures and win-win technologies are considered (Win-win model 
and Conservation model), it becomes optimal for a risk averse farmer at the margin to apply more of 
both inputs as compared to a risk neutral farmer (immediate risk effect). More of both inputs will 
increase the stock of soil fertility being available for future crop seasons which again have future risk 
implications. Since soil is risk-decreasing, such a change will be considered as desirable from a risk 
averse farmers point of view. The immediate- and long-term risk effects pulls in the same direction for 
these two partial models, thus improving the incentives for devoting resources to soil-conserving 
activities (soil conservation measures and win-win activities). If win-win inputs and soil conservation 
measures are considered risk- neutral the total effect is determined by the long-term risk effect only, 
and the same conclusions matter.  
 
From the above discussion it follows that the implications for variable input use due to risk behaviour 
in agricultural production systems are asymmetric. Higher risk aversion tends to change input-mix 
choices. In each of the two partial models this means more use of win-win inputs and soil conservation 
measures and less resources invested into productive degrading activities. However, the implications 
for soil conservation incentives arising from such input changes are symmetric. Less use of degrading 
inputs and more use of conservation measures and win-win inputs will all strengthen the incentives for 
soil conservation. The conclusions arrived at above depend on quite restrictive assumptions on 
technology. Considering each variable input at a time (partial models) means that numerous indirect 
effects present in (13) are ignored. In order to investigate the role of such effects we return to the 
general model, however a simplifying assumption is introduced. In the following win-win inputs will 
be ignored (W is kept constant throughout the planning horizon) and only productive inputs and soil 
conservation measures are considered. As a consequence the model structure of this model coincides 
with the model suggested by LaFrance (1992). Now (13) becomes as follows 
 
(17) 
dS
d
n R n R n R n R
D
Z Z CC Z C ZC C Z CZ C C ZZ
β
α α α α
=
− − +
 
 
where D is negative. Since win-win inputs are ignored, we are now left with only four R-terms. From 
(2) we already know that nZ is positive while nC is negative. Furthermore, we have already made 
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appealing assumptions on the signs of the risk-factors (αZ is positive and αC is negative). As a 
consequence, the R-terms present in the numerator are the only ones remaining indeterminate.  
 
In the following we will adopt some assumptions on technology which is applied in deterministic 
studies on the optimal control of soil degradation, in order to see whether they can help in signing the 
R-terms. The assumptions on technology which will be used are as follows; 
 
I) Additional conservation mitigates the soil degrading effects of more intensive cultivation, nZC<0 
(LaFrance, 1992; Barrett, 1996). 
II) A higher cultivation intensity (additional use of productive inputs) increases the marginalproduc-
tivity of soil, fSZ>0 (Barbier, 1990; LaFrance, 1992). 
III) Conservation inputs (higher conservation intensity) reduce the marginal productivity of both 
soiland productive inputs (more intensive cultivation), fZC<0, fSC<0 (LaFrance, 1992). 
IV) The cross partial derivatives of the costs function is zero, hZC=0 (LaFrance, 1992; Barrett, 1996; 
and Barbier, 1991; - all assume input unit costs). 
 
Below the four R-terms are written out in length 
 
(18a) R H
n
r
f g
CC CC
C
SC SC
= − −( )β  
(18b) R H
n
r
f g
ZZ ZZ
Z
SZ SZ
= − −( )β  
(18c) R f g n
n
r
f g
CZ CZ CZ CZ
C
SZ SZ
= − − − −β λ β( )  
(18d) R f g n
n
r
f g
ZC ZC ZC ZC
Z
SC SC
= − − − −β λ β( )  
 
Since the Hamiltonian is strictly concave in Z and C, and by using assumption II and III, it follows 
that both (18a) and (18b) are negative. Eq. (17) can now be signed if (18c) and (18d) are negative. 
However, it follows from assumption I-III, that RZC and RCZ can not be signed due to opposing cross 
partial derivatives effects of the production function and the fertility loss function.  
 
We have shown that some R-terms can not be signed without making non-appealing assumptions on 
technology. However, signing all R-terms is not a sufficient condition for reaching a determinant 
conclusion. We may still be left with opposing effects, and if win-win activities are included the 
picture becomes even more complicated since additional indirect effects are introduced. This feature 
emphasises the inherently difficulty in arriving at determinant conclusions in economic models on soil 
conservation focusing on input-mix choices, which seems to distinguish them from other dynamic 
models on natural resources. First, soil degradation models often contain at least two instruments 
(variable inputs) which opposes each other with respect to their effect on the stock variable. Second, 
the soil stock itself is an argument in the criteria function. Both features introduces indirect effects, 
being one important reason for the inability to sign comparative statics effects. How important the 
indirect effects are remains a question to be examined by empirical investigation. 
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Now I will reintroduce win-win inputs into the model, but assume additive separability in the 
production function, the fertility loss function and the cost function. This assumption implies that 
indirect effects are ignored (or considered unimportant), and that the focus is on direct effects only. As 
a consequence the numerator of (13) becomes as follows; 
 
(19) 
dS
d
n H H n H H n H H
D
C C ZZ WW W W ZZ CC Z Z CC WW
β
α α α
=
+ +
 
 
(where D is positive). From our earlier assumptions it can easily be confirmed that (19) is positive. We 
are left with three positive direct effects on steady state soil fertility, each for one of the variable inputs 
in the model. The conclusions arrived at in the partial approach above are confirmed in (19) 
 
In some works which model soil-human interactions the causal links are less complex than is the case 
for this model. Here, simplifications are undertaken in order to focus on particular features which are 
considered as important and/or the analyses are adopted to particular regions and/or farming systems. 
Furthermore, the focus can be on specific land degradation processes which are considered as the 
limiting factor for particular soils. One observed approach is to relate crop production to the degree of 
soil degradation experienced. The model suggested by Ardila and Innes (1993) is of this type, in that 
soil degradation is output-induced. Similar features are found in models on fallowing systems (see e.g. 
Larson and Bromley, 1990). Other models in the literature, however, portray soil conservation as 
being output-induced (see Aune et al., 1994, Alfsen et al., 1995, Aune and Lal, 1995, and Brekke et 
al., 1996). In these models, both erosion processes and nutrient recycling processes are considered, 
while the role of soil conservation measures are not considered. If we focus on how erosion processes 
are related to output level in these models, a higher output level implies lower levels of soil losses. 
 
Important features of the two very different modelling approaches appear however as special cases of 
our model. The structure of the model of Ardila and Innes can be represented by ignoring conservation 
measures and win-win inputs and focus on productive inputs only (Cultivation model). By applying 
these assumptions into our framework and let q denote the unit cost of a productive input, profits at 
date t can be described as follows: 
 
(20) Π
t t t t t t t t t t t
f S Z C W qZ F S Z qZ= − = −( , , , , ) ( , , )θ θ  
 
Let the farmer minimise costs in period t for a given soil stock and a given crop production, 
[Yt=F(St,Zt,θt)], under the assumption of θt no longer being a stochastic parameter but a constant in the 
crop production function (deterministic cost minimisation approach). Solving this problem gives the 
following cost function: C Y S q
t t
( , , )θ . Using the envelope theorem, it can be shown that the cost 
function is increasing in crop production (Y) while decreasing in soil quality (S). The profit function 
in (20) can now be expressed as follows; 
 
(21) Π
t t t t
Y C Y S q= − ( , ; , )θ  
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The stochastic production profits of Ardila and Innes (1993) is as follows; 
 
(22) Π
t t t t
Q Y C Y S= −( , ) ( , )ε  
 
Ardila and Innes denote Y the ex-ante production target which yields the ex-post production of 
Q(Y,ε), where ε is a random variable representing revenue uncertainty, and where Y and S is a 
positive and a negative argument in the cost function, respectively. We see by comparing (21) and (22) 
that the structure of the model of Ardila and Innes is similar to the Cultivation model.  
 
If we ignore soil conservation measures and productive inputs in our general model (keeping them 
constant for the rest of the horizon) and only direct attention to the role of win-win inputs, we arrive at 
model in which there is a monotone relationship between output and soil erosion (Win-win model). 
Additional use of a win-win input increases crop production but on the same time reduces soil fertility 
losses. How soil conservation incentives are affected by risk behaviour in output-induced degradation 
models and in output-induced conservation model will depend on what the risk properties of crop 
production (inputs) are. In the way the models are portrayed here, it is likely that conservation 
incentives under production uncertainty are strengthened in both model types. For the output-induced 
soil-conservation model, a higher degree of risk aversion induces a farmer to produce more outputs if 
output is considered to be risk-decreasing or risk-neutral. The presence of risk averse preferences in an 
output-induced soil degradation model induces a farmer to produce less if output is risk-increasing or 
risk-neutral. 
 
Ardila and Innes found, considering revenue uncertainty only, that long-term soil conservation 
incentives are improved if farmers are risk averse. However, comparing the results arrived at in Ardila 
and Innes under pure revenue uncertainty with our model under production uncertainty - considering 
productive inputs only - is not straightforward. One important reason for this is seen from comparing 
(21) and (22). Ardila and Innes model the presence of revenue uncertainty as not having any effect on 
optimal cost-minimisation behaviour, a feature which distinguishes their analysis from this one. Ardila 
and Innes stress the fact that they focus uncertainties which are associated with the more distant future. 
In this paper on the other hand the focus is on near-term uncertainties. There is one assumption, 
however, which seems to be important for some of the conclusions Ardila and Innes arrive at. They 
assume that the ex-post revenue function has the following property: QΥε≥0. If a similar assumption 
was applied in our analysis, given the specification of the stochastic crop production function which is 
present in (3a), then risk-increasing properties would be imposed. Another conclusion is that if Ardila 
and Innes paid attention to input-mix choices instead of output itself, under medium and long-term 
revenue uncertainty, their conclusions would be less decisive. The possibility of controlling and 
arresting degradation processes by implementing structural conservation measures like the planting of 
trees as windshields, constructing terraces, building waterways and drainage systems, and devoting 
more resources to win-win activities, imply that there are additional forces at play in connection with 
risk attitudes, compared to those arrived at in output-induced degradation models. In this perspective 
their results do not appear robust.  
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Our model of land degradation intends to describe farming systems of relatively complexity, with an 
array of inputs to choose between all having various effects on future soil quality. However, many 
farming systems, especially in less developed regions of the world, are more simple in their structure. 
External inputs are not always available or they are perceived as expensive from the farmers’ point of 
view. The crucial input besides land itself is labour effort. Under such circumstances it can be relevant 
to describe a farming unit as a system of output-induced soil degradation. One example is various 
fallow-cultivation systems. In such traditional institutions, soil fertility is maintained by returning 
cropland to fallowland for a shorter or longer period of time. More intensive cultivation means more 
labour effort and less land under fallow. Less land under permanent vegetation speeds up soil erosion 
processes. A trade-off between crop production and the future fertility of soil (Cultivation model), 
seems to capture the essential features by which such indigenous farming systems can be character-
ised. If putting more land under cultivation is perceived as an immediate risk increasing strategy, while 
soil fertility is perceived as a risk decreasing production factor, risk averse preferences induce farmers 
in fallow-cultivation systems to keep more land under fallow relatively to croplands.  
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4. Output price uncertainty and soil conservation incentives 
In this section I will analyse the role of output price uncertainty in connection with soil conservation 
incentives, in order to investigate if risk behaviour arising from crop price uncertainty differ from risk 
behaviour under production uncertainty. The important implication for our model from modelling 
uncertainty in output prices is that the random disturbance (θ) now will enter the production function 
in a multiplicative manner as opposed to risk in Section 3.  
 
To see this I write out the revenue function under output price uncertainty, using our earlier specifica-
tion of the production function presented in (3). The revenue function Ω may be written as follows; 
 
(23) Ω Ψ= + =θ θ[ ( , , , ) ( , , , )] ( , , , )f S Z C W g S Z C W S Z C W  
 
It follows that the marginal change in the variance of revenues is given by  
 
(24) 
dVar
di
f S Z C W g S Z C W f S Z C W g S Z C W Var
S Z C W S Z C W Var where i S Z C W
i i
i
{ }
[ ( , , , ) ( , , , )][ ( , , , ) ( , , , )] { }
( , , , ) ( , , , ) { } , , ,
Ω
Ψ Ψ
= + +
= =
2
2
θ
θ
 
 
From (24) we can see that a mutiplicative stochastic specification of the overall revenue function 
imposes an additional constraint. The marginal risk effect from each production factor follows from 
the assumptions made on the overall production function, Ψ. These properties have implications for 
the conclusions arrived when output price uncertainty is considered, since risk effects now are 
determined solely by the relationships of inputs with expected revenues. All production factors which 
enters the overall production function, ψ, in a positive way become risk-increasing, while those who 
decrease output when applied in larger quantities become risk-decreasing. For our model such a 
specification implies that the variance of revenues will increase with stock of soil fertility, productive 
inputs, and win-win activities, while it will decrease with structural soil conservation measures; gS > 0, 
gZ > 0, gW > 0 and gC < 0. If we relate these technological properties to Table 1, we find that the risk-
factor for win-win activities can be signed. Both the immediate and the long-term risk effect pulls in 
the same direction when win-win activities are considered. However, for structural conservation 
measures and productive activities this will not be case, here the immediate-risk effects and the long-
term risk effects oppose each other, and neither αZ or αC can be signed. 
 
Below we will analyse the role of risk aversion in connection with output price uncertainty in partial 
models. As before I will apply a Mean-Variance utility function, and I normalise expected output price 
to one and define δ as the variance of the crop price. As a consequence VAR(Π) becomes equal to 
(F(S,X))
2δ. Let H denote the Hamiltonian for this problem  
 
(25) H F S X T X F S X
t t t t t
= − −( , ) ( ) [ ( , )]β δ2  
H is assumed to be strictly concave in X and S and the optimality conditions evaluated in steady state 
are as follows (tildes denote steady state values); 
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Following the same procedures as in the above section, the following expression for the impact on 
steady state soil fertility from a higher degree of risk aversion can be derived (arguments are omitted) 
 
(28) 
dS
d
F
D
F F
N
r
F
D
X
X
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From the saddle path condition for this problem it follows that D<0 if NX<0 (Win-win model and 
Conservation model) while D>0 if NX>0 (Cultivation model). αX  is the risk-factor for the three partial 
models when output price uncertainty is considered. Our earlier conclusion on the role of win-win 
inputs is confirmed in (28). For the Win-win model FX>0 and NX <0, as a consequence (28) is 
negative. A higher degree of risk aversion under output price uncertainty weakens the incentives for 
soil conservation, since less resources are devoted to production activities in the Win-win model. Less 
output in this model means less soil conservation. However, the risk-factors for the Cultivation model 
and the Conservation model can not be determined from (28). By rearranging (26) the following 
expression is derived  
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and since TX >0 and since the shadow price of soil fertility in steady state is positive 
[
~
( )λ β δ= −
1
1 2
r
F F
S
], the risk-factor, αX, is always positive when output price uncertainty is 
considered. We are now able to sign (28) also for the Cultivation model and the Conservation model, 
in spite of the presence of opposing risk effects for these two models. This conclusion follows from 
the fact that changes in the variance of output which follows from marginal changes in any production 
factor is proportional to the marginal productivity of the same factor. This is seen by studying a 
situation in which there are no variable costs associated with changing the intensity of one of the 
activities, TX = 0. From equation (29) we now notice that risk preferences have no effect on steady 
state soil fertility in all three partial models.  Since risk preferences include both immediate- and long-
term effects, the absence of variable input costs means that any risk preferences will outweigh each 
other at the margin. If variable costs do exist, risk preferences will matter since costs are left 
unaffected by such preferences thus acting as a wedge between immediate- and future risk preferences.  
 
The implication of all risk-factors being positive is that less resources are devoted to input use in all 
three partial models. Output price uncertainty induces a risk averse farmer to cultivate less intensively, 
but also to invest fewer resources into soil conservation measures and win-win technologies. The 
implications for soil conservation of this withdrawal of resources is however asymmetric. Less 
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intensive cultivation reduces the rate at which soils are deteriorating, while less investment in soil 
conservation and win-win technologies, on the other hand, will speed up land degradation.  
 
The conclusion arrived at have similarities to the ones arrived at in standard theory of production 
under uncertainty where the commonly used multiplicative stochastic specification is applied (see e.g. 
Sandmo, 1971). The main conclusion from such analyses is that risk averse preferences induce a 
decision maker to apply less of risky resources compared to risk neutral preferences - for model 
specifications with one variable input or where output itself is the decision variable. The modelling of 
uncertainty in the production process of such models coincide with the situation for the land manager 
in our problem. The outcome of an uncertain event is only known to the producer after the decisions 
about input use have been made. Thus, the decision about how much resources to devote to an activity 
is an irreversible decision. However, in spite of the similarity with respect to the conclusions on input 
use, the forces at play in our analysis are not identical to those of the analyses mentioned above. The 
mechanisms which drive the results are different for static models as compared to our dynamic 
analysis. Remember that in standard theory of production all inputs are positive arguments in the 
production function, as a consequence all inputs become risk-increasing. In our model, on the other 
hand, structural soil conservation measures are risk-decreasing due to their land ousting effects. In 
spite of this property we have shown that a risk averse decision maker will find it optimal to apply less 
of such inputs (Conservation model). This conclusion may appear surprising, but is brought about by 
the dynamic nature of the model. If a farmer invests in additional conservation measures to reduce the 
immediate risk, the future stock of soil fertility will as a consequence be higher. Since soil fertility is a 
positive argument in the production function, a higher stock of soil fertility will increase long-term 
risk. For soil conservation measures, the long-term risk effect will dominate the immediate risk effect. 
Whether or not soil conservation measures are assumed to take up productive land does not change 
this conclusion. The same opposing effects were identified for productive land degrading inputs 
(Cultivation model). For this input group however, the withdrawal of resources is due to the 
immediate-risk effect dominating the long-term effect. For win-win activities both effects pulls in the 
same direction. 
 
The analysis in section 3 have already made it clear that the final effect on soil conservation incentives 
from risk aversion can not be signed if the general model presented in (12) was analysed under 
multiplicative uncertainty. As before a general approach will introduce numerous indirect effects 
which makes the task of signing impossible. In some sense it will be more difficult to arrive at 
conclusions under output price uncertainty than production uncertainty, since the effects on soil 
conservation incentives identified in each partial model oppose each other under output price 
uncertainty. It remains a question whether a higher degree of risk aversion induces the farmer to 
exploit the soil more or less. 
 
In standard theory of production under multiplicative uncertainty when more than one variable input is 
considered, Batra and Ulla (1974) and Hartmann (1975) have shown that the assumption of production 
complementarity is sufficient to ensure that risk averse firms will utilise smaller quantities of all 
inputs. A similar assumption is not a sufficient condition for securing less use of all inputs in our 
model. In a multi-period formulation there is a link between each agricultural input and the soil stock 
via the presence of the soil loss function, where the stock evolution over time depends on the quantity 
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applied of all other production factors. Furthermore, the stock variable (soil fertility) is a direct input 
in the agricultural production function. As a consequence, additional assumptions on technology are 
needed, both on the production function and the fertility loss function for arriving at a similar 
conclusion. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper the implications of risk averse preferences are considered. I analyse farmers which 
operate in an uncertain environment and study how risk preferences influence optimal soil conserva-
tion decisions in the absence of effective insurance markets. In doing so a multi-period model is 
presented where the focus is on input-mix choices, in the sense that a land manager has three 
instruments at disposal to determine soil evolution over time. The decision maker can choose among 
multiple inputs and/or cultivation practices which all lies within his/her technological horizon, all 
having different impacts on short-term crop production and soil degradation processes. Particular 
attention is given to the importance of the risk properties associated with each agricultural production 
factor. The focus is on short-term revenue uncertainty arising from climatic variability and the 
occurrence of natural hazards. 
 
The current study suggests that risk aversion under revenue uncertainty influences the incentives to 
arrest soil degradation but it remains unclear in what direction. However, the analysis identifies 
several factors which are crucial when determining optimal risk behaviour. First, it is important to 
distinguish between two sources of revenue uncertainty - production uncertainty and output price 
uncertainty. When analysing output price uncertainty, some conclusions became more transparent 
since the stochastic specification of output price risk imposes restrictions on the risk properties of all 
production factors. As a consequence, the overall risk effect arising from each variable input can be 
determined. Second, it is important to assess what kind of inputs which are available to the agricultural 
production systems considered, and how their use relates to both short-term output and the stock of 
soil fertility. In particular, whether it is a monotone relationship between the level of output and the 
degree of soil degradation. Third, knowledge about the risk implications arising from the farming 
decisions made are important, in particular what farmers perceptions of them are. All the above factors 
will most likely envisage variations across regions. In order to be able to predict the consequences for 
soil conservation incentives detailed knowledge about farming systems is needed. However, such 
information is not necessarily available. Many studies, especially for tropical soils, find that there is an 
empirical gap as concerning relationships between cultivation practices, input use, and soil degrada-
tion processes (see e.g. Aune and Lal, 1994). Due to the site specific character of degradation 
processes, the huge variation in farming systems across regions, and the possible ambiguity in 
farmers’ perceptions of the risk properties arising from various inputs.  
 
Furthermore, valuable knowledge is obtained by focusing on partial models (or direct effects). Under 
output price uncertainty, the direct effects from productive inputs on soil conservation incentives are 
opposing those arising from conserving inputs (win-win inputs and soil conservation measures). 
Compared to a situation under certainty, risk averse preferences induce a farmer to apply less of all 
inputs - both degrading - and conserving inputs. Under production uncertainty, by applying reasonable 
assumptions on the risk property of each production factor, risk aversion induces a farmer to apply less 
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of degrading inputs and more of conserving inputs. As a consequence it seems more likely that soil 
conservation incentives improve under production uncertainty than is the case for output price 
uncertainty. If important soil-human interlinkages can be characterised as less complex as those 
portrayed in the general framework in this paper for example by focusing directly on relationships 
between crop production and level of soil degradation more decisive conclusions can be derived.  
 
The analysis further stresses the importance of analysing soil conservation incentives in a dynamic 
setting. If this analysis was undertaken in a static context, all effects which arise from soil base 
changes would be absent and some conclusions would be reversed. One example is the overall risk 
effect from soil conservation measures when analysing output price uncertainty. As mentioned earlier, 
evidence on risk attitudes and soil conservation incentives is not conclusive (see e.g. Williams and 
Johnson, 1985; Klemme, 1985; Kramer, McSweeney, and Stavros, 1983; Reinhardt, 1987; and 
Anderson and Thampapillai, 1990, for a discussion of the references). The mixed findings can well be 
understood within our model. We have identified contradicting direct effects across the three activities 
when output price uncertainty is considered. In a general setting, the presence of indirect effects makes 
it difficult to arrive at unique conclusions for both sources of uncertainty. How important such effects 
are should be a subject of future research. 
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Appendix 
Necessary and sufficient conditions for a local saddle path equilibrium for 
problem (12). 
One way to derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for a saddle path equilibrium for the 
dynamic system (12bc) and (1), is to solve the sub system in (12b) for Z, C, and W, simultaneously 
(Modified Dynamic Hamiltonian System). Hence we arrive at the following equations  
 
(A.1) 
Z A S
C B S
W E S
=
=
=
( , , )
( , , )
( , , )
λ β
λ β
λ β
 
 
By inserting the equations in (A.1) into (12c) and (1), respectively, we arrive at a dynamic system for 
which the saddle path conditions may be derived. We find that the eigen values that correspond to this 
system (evaluated in equilibrium) are real and opposite, if 
 
(A.2) 
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(see below for a definition of Ai , Bi , and Ei , where i = S, λ ). After extensive manipulation (A.2) may 
be rewritten as follows 
 
(A.3) J
r
F
D= < 0  
 
where F and D are defined below. If the Hamiltonian is assumed to be strictly concave in (Z, C, W), F 
becomes negative. For the necessary and sufficient condition for a saddle path equilibrium to be 
fulfilled D must be positive. 
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The denominator D in (13) written out in length. 
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